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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clark Jackson Cleveland appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated
battery.

Mr. Cleveland was found guilty following a jury trial and the district court

imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. Mr. Cleveland appeals
and asserts that the district court erred by admitting hearsay evidence.

Because

Mr. Cleveland did not “open the door” to the admission of this evidence, he requests
that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Eluith Delgado, an inmate at the Idaho Department of Correction, testified that,
on August 1, 2014, while he was using the bathroom, Mr. Cleveland threw boiling water
at him.

(State’s Exhibit 1b, p.7, Ls.2-13.)1

Mr. Cleveland hit and stabbed him in the head.

Then, according to Mr. Delgado,
(State’s Exhibit 1b, p.8, Ls.1-5.)

Mr. Delgado acknowledged that he had threatened Mr. Cleveland and challenged him to
a fight a week or two before this incident. (State’s Exhibit 1b, p.18, Ls.6-25.)
John Mayberry, a trauma surgeon at St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
testified that Mr. Delgado suffered from first degree burns on the right side of his face
and a swollen right ear. (Tr., Vol. II, p.128, Ls.2-4.) He had a puncture wound and a
hematoma along his right jaw.

(Tr., Vol. II, p.128, Ls.2-4.)

Mr. Delgado also had

blistering second degree burns on his neck and anterior chest extending down on to his
upper abdomen. (Tr., Vol. II, p.128, Ls.8-10.) He had a puncture wound on the left side

1

in the temporal area. (Tr., Vol. II, p.128, Ls.2-4.) He also had some tenderness in his
facial bones along the left cheek and bruising around his left eye. (Tr., Vol. II, p.128,
Ls.15-17.) Mr. Delgado sustained an injury to his external carotid artery. (Tr., Vol. II,
p.130, Ls.12-13.)
Jerrod Watson, a detective with the Ada County Sheriff’s Office, conducted the
investigation of the alleged battery. He found blood on the toilet, the floor, and the wall.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.70, Ls.19-20.) He also found a “white plastic cup or tumbler,” and said
that he had been given information from an inmate about Mr. Cleveland carrying that
cup. (Tr., Vol. II, p.72, Ls.17-25.) Detective Watson reviewed a video which he stated
showed Mr. Delgado and Mr. Cleveland being in the bathroom at the same time for
about a minute; another inmate, Mr. Cleveland’s cellmate, was in the room for about
eight seconds with them. (Tr., Vol. II, p.88, Ls.9-16; p.84, Ls.24-25.)
Detective Watson also identified an inmate named Harrod as being relevant to
the investigation because he was also on the video and could be seen walking over to
the bathroom and looking inside and eventually going into the shower. (Tr., Vol. II, p.90,
Ls.16-25; p.93, Ls.9-13.) Inmate Harrod was suspected of being a lookout. (Tr., Vol. II,
p.96, Ls.11-15.)
On cross-examination, Detective Watson acknowledged that he did not know
whether the plastic cup was tested for fingerprints, whether any clothes or shoes were
tested for DNA, and that there were no eyewitnesses, other than Mr. Delgado, to the
incident. (Tr., Vol. II, p.110, L.21 – 111, L.25.)

1

Mr. Delgado refused to testify at trial and was therefore declared unavailable.
Consequently, his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. State’s Exhibit 1b
is a redacted copy of Mr. Delgado’s preliminary hearing testimony.
2

During cross-examination of Detective Watson, counsel for Mr. Cleveland asked
the following question:
Q. Did you come across any witnesses that – or spoke to anyone that
may have saw Cleveland use the microwave?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that Harrod?
A. Yes.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.113, Ls.6-11.)
On redirect, the State asked Detective Watson the following question:
Q. Counsel asked you about Mr. Harrod and the use of the microwave.
A. Correct.
Q. What did he say about Cleveland’s use of the microwave?
(Tr., Vol. II, p.115, Ls.17-21.) Counsel for Mr. Cleveland objected on the ground of
hearsay. (Tr., Vol. II, p.115, Ls.20-21.) The court ruled, “You opened the door, counsel.
Overruled.” (Tr., Vol. II, p.115, Ls.24-25.) Detective Watson then testified,
Mr. Harrod told me that he knew that Mr. Cleveland was heating up
something in the microwave. That he knew it was in the white cup. He
told me that Cleveland said he was heating up oatmeal and Mr. Harrod
assumed it was water being heated up.
And that he witnessed
Mr. Cleveland carry the tumbler from the top of the microwave out of the
day room.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.116, Ls.1-7.) Detective Watson then testified that this was around the
time of Mr. Cleveland entering the bathroom. (Tr., Vol. II, p.116, Ls.10-13.)
Mr. Cleveland was found guilty of aggravated battery. (R., p.148.) The district
court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed. (R., p.149.)
Mr. Cleveland appealed.

(R., p.154.)

He asserts that the district court erred by
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admitting inadmissible hearsay because Mr. Cleveland did not open the door to its
admission.

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err by admitting hearsay evidence because it erroneously
concluded that Mr. Cleveland had opened the door to its admission?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Admitting Hearsay Evidence Because It Erroneously
Concluded That Mr. Cleveland Had Opened The Door To Its Admission

A.

Introduction
Mr. Cleveland asserts that the district court erred by holding that he had opened

the door to hearsay evidence of a conversation Detective Watson had with inmate
Harrod. He asserts that he did not open the door to the admission of the substance of
the conversation when he only inquired on cross-examination whether a conversation
occurred.

B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision about whether to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 634 (1999). When a trial
court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
C.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Hearsay Evidence Because It Erroneously
Concluded That Mr. Cleveland Had Opened The Door To Its Admission
“Hearsay, which is made generally inadmissible by Idaho Rule of Evidence 802,

is defined as: ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’ I.R.E.
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801(c).” State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 704 (Ct. App. 1994). “The hearsay rule not
only prohibits repetition of the actual out-of-court statement; it also applies where the
witness attempts to convey the substance or purport of the statement.” Id.
In this case, during cross-examination of Detective Watson, counsel for
Mr. Cleveland asked the following question:
Q. Did you come across any witnesses that – or spoke to anyone that
may have saw Cleveland use the microwave?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that Harrod?
A. Yes.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.113, Ls.6-11.)
On redirect, the State asked Detective Watson the following question:
Q. Counsel asked you about Mr. Harrod and the use of the microwave.
A. Correct.
Q. What did he say about Cleveland’s use of the microwave?
(Tr., Vol. II, p.115, Ls.17-21.) Counsel for Mr. Cleveland objected on the ground of
hearsay. (Tr., Vol. II, p.115, Ls.20-21.) The court ruled, “You opened the door, counsel.
Overruled.” (Tr., Vol. II, p.115, Ls.24-25.) Detective Watson then testified,
Mr. Harrod told me that he knew that Mr. Cleveland was heating up
something in the microwave. That he knew it was in the white cup. He
told me that Cleveland said he was heating up oatmeal and Mr. Harrod
assumed it was water being heated up.
And that he witnessed
Mr. Cleveland carry the tumbler from the top of the microwave out of the
day room.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.116, Ls.1-7.) Detective Watson then testified that this was around the
time of Mr. Cleveland entering the bathroom. (Tr., Vol. II, p.116, Ls.10-13.)
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The only substance of the district court’s analysis of this issue is, “You opened
the door, counsel. Overruled.” (Tr., Vol. II, p.115, Ls.24-25.) The court, therefore,
seemed to recognize that the State was seeking the admission of hearsay evidence.
Mr. Cleveland submits, however, that the court did not reach the decision to admit the
evidence through an exercise of reason, because Mr. Cleveland did not inquire on
cross-examination of the substance of Detective Watson’s conversation with inmate
Harrod.
“As an evidentiary principle, the concept of ‘opening the door’ allows the
admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony to ‘qualify, explain, or limit’ testimony or
evidence previously admitted.” Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 579 (Fla.1999)
(quoting Tompkins v. State, 502 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla.1986)).
Because fairness is the key concern of this evidentiary principle, the mere
fact that testimony may be characterized as incomplete or misleading
does not automatically trigger the admission of otherwise inadmissible
evidence under the “opening the door” rule. Rather, the State must
demonstrate a legitimate need to resort to such evidence to correct a false
impression. Otherwise, the “opening the door” rule threatens to become a
pretext for the illegitimate use of inadmissible evidence, and the fairnesspromoting purpose of the rule is lost.
In deciding whether fairness requires the admission of evidence under the
“opening the door” principle, a court should consider the “general
unreliability of inadmissible evidence.” Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568,
580 (Fla.1999). The more unreliable the evidence is, the less likely it is
that fairness requires its admission. See id. Hearsay is sometimes
admissible under the “opening the door” principle. Nevertheless, the
inherent unreliability of hearsay is a factor to be considered when it is
sought to be admitted under this principle. See Ramirez, 739 So.2d at
580. In such a situation, “the appropriate inquiry ... is whether based on
considerations of fairness, the door was opened wide enough by defense
counsel's questions to permit otherwise inadmissible and unreliable
statements to be admitted into evidence.” Id.
Redd v. State, 49 So.3d 329, 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citations omitted).
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In this case, counsel for Mr. Cleveland only asked if Detective Watson spoke to
anyone regarding Mr. Cleveland and the microwave. This was likely due to Detective
Watson’s testimony that he had been given information from an inmate about
Mr. Cleveland carrying that cup. (Tr., Vol. II, p.72, Ls.17-25.) Admission of inherently
unreliable and inadmissible hearsay evidence concerning the substance of that
conversation does not qualify, limit, or explain Detective Watson’s answer to the
question asked during cross-examination.

It is not as though Mr. Cleveland asked

about part of a conversation and State needed to admit the remainder of the
conversation in order to fully explain it.

If the district court was correct that

Mr. Cleveland opened the door, this would mean that any time a party asked if a
conversation occurred, the other party could seek admissible of unreliable hearsay of
that conversation. Because Mr. Cleveland did not open the door to the substance of the
conversation Detective Watson had with inmate Harrod, Mr. Cleveland submits that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony.
Finally, where there is a contemporaneous objection to the admission of
testimony, the burden is on the State to demonstrate that the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010). Considering that
there were no eyewitnesses to the incident other than Mr. Delgado and there is no
fingerprint or DNA evidence in this case, Mr. Cleveland submits that the State will be
unable to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Cleveland requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2017.

___________/s/______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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